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I read with great interest the Commentary by Trunkey,1 published in the March 1993 issue of the Archives. For the most part, Trunkey hit the nail squarely on the head. If he is off the mark at all, it is because he has underestimated the problems of mobilizing military medicine in the early stages of Desert Shield, and he concentrated on the problems encountered in his US Army Reserve unit. In actuality, the difficulties encountered by those of us who were in theater for the majority of the operations may not be appreciated by those who arrived several months later. Remarkable progress had been made by the time Trunkey's reserve unit had arrived in the Kuwait theater of operations. However, his comments concerning the lack of readiness of personnel, specifically inadequate trauma experience, poor logistical support, and lack of organized medical regulation, are quite correct. Since I was assigned
Smith CRS. Comments on Lessons Learned. Arch Surg. 1993;128(12):1399-1400. doi:10.1001/archsurg.1993.01420240107022