Virtually every course of medical action is associated with
some adverse risk to the patient. Discussing these risks with patients
is a fundamental duty of physicians both to fulfill a role as trusted
adviser and to promote the ethical principle of autonomy (particularly
as embodied in the doctrine of informed consent). Discussing medical
risk is a difficult task to accomplish appropriately. Challenges stem
from gaps in the physician's knowledge about pertinent risks,
uncertainty about how much and what kind of information to communicate,
and difficulties in communicating risk information in a format that is
clearly understood by most patients. For example, a discussion of the
risk of undergoing a procedure should be accompanied by a discussion of
the risk of not undergoing a procedure. This article describes basic
characteristics of risk information, outlines major challenges in
communicating risk information, and suggests several ways to
communicate risk information to patients in an understandable format.
Ultimately, a combination of formats (eg, qualitative, quantitative,
and graphic) may best accommodate the widely varying needs,
preferences, and abilities of patients. Such communication will help
the physician accomplish the fundamental duty of teaching the patient
the information necessary to make an informed and appropriate
decision.
You tell me the chance of becoming incontinent
from this surgery is 5%. What does that mean? If I get it, it's 100%
for me, right?" (spoken by a patient in a study examining
perceptions, risks, and benefits of treatments for localized prostate
cancer).
The patient quoted is facing a difficult choice: whether to undergo
radical prostatectomy for localized prostate cancer. As he considers
his options, he must also consider the potential for unwanted
consequences from each choice: the risks. Understanding risk is crucial
to appropriate decision making, yet it is also a complex task that
mixes objective information (What is the risk? How often does the
unwanted outcome occur?) with subjective information (How important is
this potential unwanted outcome to me?). This patient's case
illustrates the importance of risk to individuals, but risk is also
important on a societal and policy level, as illustrated by the ongoing
controversy regarding the appropriateness of screening mammography for
women in their 40s. Here, we suspect, part of the controversy stems
from uncertainty regarding the risks involved (the risks of developing
breast cancer in this age range, the risks of false-positive mammogram
results, etc), or from differences in the interpretation of the
magnitude of the various risks.
Every course of action or inaction in medical care may be associated
with both risks and benefits. In discussing the options for managing
diverse conditions, physicians must decide how much and what kind of
information to present and how to frame the discussion. These
discussions are constrained by frequent gaps in the state of medical
knowledge, the limited knowledge of individual physicians concerning
existing data, and patients' differing abilities and desires to
understand the details of their conditions and treatments. Furthermore,
advances in medical knowledge, concerns about liability, and the
expanding influence of economic concerns in health care create
pressures that may influence the medical decision-making process, even
at the level of individual decisions.
Despite these pressures, communicating information about
illnesses, treatments, and prognoses is a frequent and fundamental duty
of the physician. The duty stems in large part from the primacy of the
ethical principle of autonomy, particularly as embodied in the doctrine
of informed consent.1 Patients must understand the risks
and benefits of the options they face to make informed decisions that
are appropriate both medically and personally, and physicians must be
able to provide suitable, accurate information about risks and benefits
in personal, accessible terms to fulfill their essential roles as
trusted advisors. Frequently, however, risk is not mentioned at all in
medical encounters2,3—perhaps a reflection of our unease
with the existence of risks in the first place.
Our goals in this article are to describe basic dimensions of
medical risk, the challenges involved in discussing risks, and some of
the options for presenting risk
information. The concept of risk generally
embodies at least 2 distinct notions: first, an unwanted outcome, and
second, some uncertainty about the occurrence of that
outcome.1,4 We use the term risk in the sense of
this common use, but try to use the corresponding terms unwanted
outcome and probability when we discuss those aspects of
risk. We focus specifically on the communication of risk information
from physician to patient because of the centrality of this
relationship in health care decisions.
Ascertaining the pertinent risks is the first major challenge the
physician faces in considering risk. Discussions of risks in medicine
involve not only the chance of death but a myriad other outcomes (eg,
vegetative state after cardiopulmonary resuscitation, incontinence
following surgery for localized prostate cancer, missed subarachnoid
hemorrhage in a patient with a new headache).
Understanding pertinent risks, however, does not mean simply knowing
the identity of the risks; the concept of risk has several fundamental
dimensions, and explicit consideration of these dimensions may
facilitate more appropriate discussions (Table 1).
What Are the Pertinent Unwanted Outcomes? Identification of pertinent unwanted outcomes is the first task of the
physician in approaching medical risk and requires objective
description of the outcome of interest (eg, death, disability, pain).
The identity of the outcomes is often determined by the activity that
provokes the risks. For example, the chance of dying from playing
sports is low, but the risk for certain injuries may be reasonably
high, such as knee injuries in football. In medicine, there may be
several easily identifiable risks associated with an action, ranging in
severity from mild (eg, minor nausea or pain) to moderate (eg,
complication requiring further therapy and time lost from work) to
severe (eg, death).
Identifying the pertinent unwanted outcomes will be difficult if
some or all of the risks are not known or fully understood in a given
situation. In some situations, one may even have to decide whether a
given outcome represents a risk or benefit. For example, chemotherapy
might allow a person to live longer with an otherwise incurable cancer.
This added life expectancy might be a benefit to some people but for
others, the extra time spent in discomfort would be a risk. Most of the
time, however, the benefits and risks will be clear. Living longer and
having a better quality of life are benefits whereas dying sooner and
developing pain or loss of function are unwanted outcomes.
How Permanent Is the Unwanted Outcome? The permanence or duration of an unwanted outcome is a second
dimension of risk—one that may tip the balance in favor of or against
a certain course of action. Some unwanted outcomes may be permanent
(eg, death) whereas others may be transient (eg, pain). For the
appropriate benefit, many patients may be willing to face a high chance
of severe impairment as long as it will be transient, but may balk if
the impairment will be long lasting or permanent. In the case of
surgery for prostate cancer, the possibility of permanent incontinence
or impotence may sway some patients to favor watchful waiting.
When Will the Unwanted Outcome Occur? The third dimension of risk is its timing. Outcomes may occur
very soon (eg, not surviving an operation, becoming nauseated following
administration of medicine), in several months (eg, restenosis of a
cardiac vessel following angioplasty), or in several years (eg,
developing a blood malignancy from aggressive chemotherapy of a
previous cancer). For example, patients with multivessel coronary
artery disease are often faced with a difficult decision; surgical
therapy results, on average, in improved life expectancy in the long
run, but complications may lead to early death or significant
short-term morbidity. The patient may be trying to balance present
benefit with future risk or, conversely, may be deciding whether to
accept significant present risk for possible future benefit. In
economically derived models of health care decisions, such as
cost-effectiveness models, one of the key assumptions is that time in
the present is more valuable than time in the future and, hence, future
benefit is "discounted." But the weight given to something that
happens now as opposed to in the future is a highly individual
function, and models based on the average will not be meaningful to
many patients.
How Likely Is the Unwanted Outcome? The fourth dimension of risk is its probability (ie, how likely
is the unwanted outcome?). This number is known with varying degrees of
certainty for different risks,4 and errors in the
quantitative assessment of risks may be common.5 For
physicians, this number may simply be difficult to remember.
Additionally, the distinction between risk due to a single exposure and
cumulative risk from multiple exposures may have to be considered.
Probability may be the most
difficult element to communicate in an
understandable way to many patients.
How Much Does the Unwanted Outcome Matter to the Patient? The fifth—and perhaps most important—dimension of risk is its
value to the patient; that is, its subjective "badness." Different
patients will inevitably rate some adverse outcomes differently. What
one person views as catastrophic may be viewed by another as an
impediment that does not detract from overall quality of life. The
ultimate determination of importance is subjective.
The first 4 fundamental dimensions of risk—identity, permanence,
timing, and probability—may help patients determine a personal value
for the risk. In general, the value of most risks is closely allied
with their identity. For example, death and mutilation are usually
considered risks of great importance, whereas transient nausea would
usually be considered a risk of relatively low significance. A risk may
seem more tangible to a patient if it is serious and has a high chance
of occurring in the short term. On the other hand, risks with a low
chance of occurrence or those that would happen in the distant future
may seem more nebulous or less threatening, even serious risks, such as
death. Because the probabilities can often be very small, risks may not
be conceptually accessible to patients trying to make decisions.
The value placed on a risk may be partly explained by concepts of
risk perception developed by Slovic,6 in which risk is
arranged along 2 axes relating to dread and uncertainty. Dread
risks, such as nuclear reactor accidents, are uncontrollable,
catastrophic, and not equitable, whereas risks from things like
caffeine or aspirin are controllable, individual, and equitable.
Uncertain risks, such as those from nitrogen fertilizers, are
not observable, unknown to those exposed or the scientific community,
and delayed, in contrast with risks such as automobile crashes, that
are observable, known to those exposed and the scientific community,
and immediate. Although they are derived from mostly nonmedical
technologies, the concepts of dread and uncertainty may help explain
why patients fear some medical risks, even those that are uncommon,
more than others that are far more common.
Failure to acknowledge and discuss a patient's perceptions of risk may
lead to decisions that both the patient and physician later see as
unsatisfactory. For example, a woman without risk factors might choose
mammography at age 40 years because of a morbid fear of breast cancer
and then regret the trauma of a false-positive mammogram and its
attendant stressful evaluation. It is the responsibility of the
physician, as the most valued giver of information, to facilitate
understanding of risk by addressing potential errors or biases in
perception and to help place individual risks within the context of all
risks and benefits for all alternatives in a given situation.
Which Risks Should Be Discussed?
Selecting the risks to discuss is the second challenge in risk
communication. The physician must judge whether to address all
conceivable risks, just the most common risks, or only the most
important risks. For example, one can discuss the global level of risk
from playing football, including injury, medical cost, and time lost
from study or work, or a specific outcome, such as muscle aches, knee
injuries, or deaths. The former approach has been called a
thick conception of risk; that is, a conception that comprises
a broad range of harms, including social losses and costs; the latter
approach has been called a thin conception of risk, focusing
only on physical harm.7
Regardless of the viewpoint, different treatments will carry different
risks. How should physicians decide which risks to disclose? Various
standards have been espoused, including the professional
standard, in which the information that would generally be
disclosed by a community of medical peers sets the standard, and the
increasingly recognized reasonable person standard, in which
the information that a reasonable person in the patient's position
would want to be told sets the standard.1 Neither standard
explains precisely how a physician should decide what a reasonable
person would want to be told. Disclosure may vary depending on the
unusualness of the procedure and the probability of the outcome,
although risks of death, disability, and disfigurement generally should
be revealed.1
How Should a Physician Discuss Risks With a Patient?
The way a discussion is framed may help determine the decision a person
reaches,8-11 and features such as the physician's tone of
voice or body language or the choice of what information to present
first may influence the patient's perception of risk. Even the
language chosen may contain loaded terms that can jeopardize unbiased
communication. Risks may be considered avoidable or unavoidable,
justifiable or unjustifiable, acceptable or unacceptable, serious or
nonserious, or rare or common.12 For example, what seems
acceptable to one person may seem unacceptable to another (eg, whether
impotence following prostate surgery is serious or not depends on
individual perspective).
Qualitative vs Quantitative Probability. While the nature of an unwanted outcome must be described
qualitatively, the probability can be described either qualitatively
(eg, with terms such as rare or infrequent) or
quantitatively (eg, with expressions such as "1 in 100"). Some
patients may prefer to hear only qualitative descriptions of numerical
probability, whereas others would like to "be given the
numbers."13,14 Qualitative descriptions of probability
have the attraction of using common words that seem to be generally
understood.15 However, these words, of which there are
many, have no generally accepted anchoring at specific quantitative
levels of frequency,16 despite efforts to promote such an
anchoring.12,15 Whether the variability in interpretation
of qualitative terms is enough to be clinically important is
controversial. A rare outcome may deserve close attention if it is
death, but a rare outcome that is minor may require no further
quantification.
Quantitative Expressions for Risk. The imprecise nature of qualitative expressions of risks has led some
authors to urge that they be avoided and that risk information be
imparted with strictly
numerical expressions.17,18 There are
many options for such expressions, including absolute or relative
differences in the proportion of an outcome with 2 treatments, the
frequency with which an outcome occurs in a certain cohort size, the
average loss of life expectancy from a given exposure,19,20
the so-called safety-degree scale (the logarithm of the cohort size in
which 1 adverse event would be expected to occur),21 and
the number needed to treat22-24 (the reciprocal of the
absolute difference in proportions of patients with a given outcome
from 2 treatments or actions, which states the number of patients who
must be treated to generate 1 outcome).
Beyond the question of whether patients will understand the difference
between relative and absolute differences or the meaning of average
loss of life expectancy, there is the complementary issue of which
expression to choose. Simply altering the choice of a numerical format
can change preference for one course of action instead of another, even
if the 2 courses of action have quantitatively identical
outcomes.8,10 For example, outcomes can be framed in terms
of survival rates or mortality rates; a death rate of 10% may seem
quite different from a survival rate of 90%. As another example, a
glass half empty may be perceived differently from a glass half full,
and there will usually be a preference for the latter. Fortunately, in
this instance there is a neutral description that is often lacking in
discussions of medical risks (the 8-oz glass has 4 oz of liquid in
it).7
The framing of outcomes in terms of absolute and relative
differences10 can be manipulated to make a course of action
appear more or less favorable or unfavorable. A relative risk reduction
of 50%, for example, is less impressive when derived from the
percentages 0.5% and 1.0% than from the percentages 25% and 50%.
Furthermore, many physicians appear not to appreciate the distinction
between absolute and relative differences,25,26 a failure
that impedes the confident and correct communication of quantitative
risk information.
Common Errors in Risk Interpretation. As noted herein, patient perception of risk is a complicated
phenomenon, laden with personal values and biases that challenge
attempts to ensure the "correct" interpretation of risk information (Table 2).17,27,28 For
example, patients are subject to anchoring bias, in which patients
estimate their own risk from a given action based on another familiar
risk; availability bias, in which patients overestimate a risk that
receives substantial notoriety (eg, in the media); compression,
whereby patients overestimate small risks and underestimate large
risks; and miscalibration of confidence judgments, which leads to
overconfidence in the extent and accuracy of knowledge.27
Simply altering the scale in which a risk is placed can alter the
perceived risk.16,29 Finally, the perceived lethality of an
activity and the perceived invulnerability of some individuals may lead
them to assess their own level of risk as less than the risk to others
from the same activity.27
Given the diverse difficulties in understanding risks, people
frequently resort to powerful heuristic guides, or rules of thumb, that
provide convenient shortcut answers to probability questions, answers
that are themselves probabilistic in being right most but not all of
the time.30 These common interpretive errors pose
tremendous challenges to physicians who may be struggling to define the
risks and present them in accessible terms for patients from diverse
backgrounds.
Reconciling the Average and the Individual. The biggest challenge may be to help patients reconcile
averages derived from populations and their meaning at an individual
level. For example, although lower serum cholesterol levels result in a
reduction in the number of myocardial infarctions in a large population
of patients, an individual patient may be chagrined to learn that he is
paying a lot of money and possibly experiencing a reduction in his
quality of life for a very small chance of individual benefit. Or, a
patient may face a given treatment with the reassuring advice from a
physician that the chances of a serious complication are only 1 in 100,
but he/she may remain very concerned about whether he/she will be that
1 in 100. The angioplasty patient does not experience a 4% myocardial
infarction complication; for each individual patient, the outcome is an
all-or-none phenomenon. Thus, even if we can identify and describe
risks, the information must ultimately be expressed in terms that are
meaningful to individual patients and must allow them to make decisions
with which they are comfortable.
Patient Preference and Frameworks for Medical Decision Making. Two related issues overlying any discussion of medical risk
and implicit throughout this article are the ascertainment of patient
preference and the choice of a framework for medical decision
making.1,31,32 Patient preference may vary not only for the
relative value of diverse outcomes but also for the amount and type of
information patients want to be given, the manner in which it is given,
and the degree to which they participate in and control the
decision-making process. The physician may be inclined to prefer 1 of
several different frameworks for decision making, ranging from one in
which the paternalistic physician controls the decision to one in which
patient and physician share responsibility or to one in which the
autonomous patient entirely controls the decision. Yet another
framework that may assume more importance in the era of managed care is
one in which some decisions are removed from the realm of the
patient-physician
relationship all together and claimed as the
prerogative of corporate entities. Although a full discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of this article, we believe that
ascertaining patient preferences and fostering a participative mode of
decision making are of paramount importance for most situations in the
practice of medicine.
New possibilities forrisk communication
Given that one quarter of the US population has only rudimentary
reading skills and another quarter has limited reading
skills,33 there appears to be a need for alternative
formats that can be readily understood by most patients, regardless of
sophistication in numbers. For instance, recent studies examining the
use of graphic data displays found that many patients were able to use
and interpret graphic information.34,35
Another possibility, which could be studied empirically, might be to
take advantage of the natural anchoring bias to which patients are
subject by relating medical risks to known everyday nonmedical risks,
things from day-to-day life that people face frequently.4
For instance, one might equate the risk of dying from a given therapy
with the risk of dying in an automobile crash or the risk of injury
from a different therapy with the risk of injury from participation in
a particular sport. By relating medical risks to nonmedical risks, the
medical risk would be placed within the larger perspective of a
person's life, together with activities for which they have an
established sense of acceptability.
The best strategy may ultimately be a multifaceted and flexible
approach that would, after describing the unwanted outcome, describe
the frequency of the outcome using a combination of techniques, such as
a qualitative term, a numerical expression, a graph, and an example
from everyday life. One might let each patient determine which of the 4
formats is most helpful and build the discussion around that. This
strategy would have the advantage of accommodating patients with
diverse preferences and abilities for understanding risk information.
Such a strategy would also accommodate our difficulty as physicians to
vary our presentation styles to fit different situations.36
Regardless of the challenges noted herein, physicians must do the best
they can in a difficult area and strive to educate patients about the
risks of all reasonable alternatives for a given situation. It is not
often as simple as saying that the chance of dying from the operation
is 1 in 100; at the very least, the patient should know the risks of
not having the operation. Although we may not be able to get it
absolutely right, we can certainly try. In addition to considering the
challenges noted herein, physicians should encourage further
investigation of innovative means of communicating risk information.
Because much of the research on risk communication takes place either
in nonmedical situations or using hypothetical scenarios, it will be
important to ascertain the best means of communicating risks to real
patients facing real decisions. Only by helping our patients to
understand the implications of their (and our) medical decisions will
we fulfill our obligations as doctors—a word, after all, that stems
from the Latin docere, "to teach."37
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